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The Pragmatic Role of Then 
Takashi Shizawa, Tetsuya Kogusuri, Mai Osawa, and Ken-ichi Kitahara 
In this joint research, we are concerned with the pragmatic role of then m 
conditional constructions. Observe the following example: 
(1) If Max comes, (then) we can play poker. 
Example (1) shows that the occurrence of then does not affect the gran1maticality of 
the sentence. Thus, the occurrence of then has been considered to be optional. 
Indeed, Dancygier (1998: 181) claims that then is usually optional in a conditional 
construction - it may be used, but does not have to be. 
However, there are cases where the occurrence of then is not optional. Let us 
observe the following examples: 
(2) a. If they accept you, (*then) they'll kill for you, I'm not sure. 
b. If he has passed into your ownership, he'll have to obey. If not, *(then) 
we shall have to think of some other means of keeping him from his 
rightful mistress. 
The presence of then renders the sentence in (2a) ungrammatical. On the other hand, 
then occurs obligatorily in (2b). The facts observed in (2) have not been dealt with in 
previous researches. 
The occurrence of then has been studied in connection with its grammatical 
status (cf. Dancygier (1998». Roughly speaking, then is an anaphoric pronoun 
referring to if-clauses. We admit that then is an anaphoric pronoun, but it does not 
fully explain the occurrence of then exemplified in (1) and (2). To deal with the 
occurrence of then adequately, other facets must be taken into consideration. In what 
follows, we show that the occurrence of then is pragmatically constrained. 
To begin with, the alleged optionality of then can also be observed in paratactic 
conditional constructions (pseudo-imperative+and), exemplified below: 
(3) Give me some money and (then) I'll help you escape. (Tsubomoto (1986:61» 
(4) Give a dog a bad name, and (*then) he'll live up to it. (Tsubomoto (1986:61» 
According to Tsubomoto (1986), there is no objective causal relation between the 
event in the antecedent clause and the one in the subsequent clause in (3): the 
semantic connection between the two clauses is subjective. That is, it is the speaker's 
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subjectivity that relates the two clauses. The occurrence of then is optional in this 
case. In the case of (4), on the other hand, then cannot occur: the semantic 
connection between the antecedent clause and its subsequent clause is established 
automatically. By the word automatically, he means that the connection between the 
two clauses is unavoidable or inevitable. That is, they are connected objectively by 
natural laws or common sense. Thus, then in this construction functions as a marker 
of a subjective relationship between the antecedent and subsequent clauses. 
This explanation can be applied to then in if-conditional constructions. Observe 
the following data: 
(5) If you give me some money, (then) I'll help you escape. 
(6) If you give a dog a bad name, (*then) he'll live up to it. 
The intended meanings of the if-conditionals in (5) and (6) are almost the same as 
those of (3) and (4), respectively; that is, the two clauses in (5) are connected 
subjectively, while the two clauses in (6) is connected objectively. In (5), then is 
optional, as in (3). On the other hand, in (6), then cannot occur, as in (4). This 
parallelism shows that then in if-conditionals also marks a subjective relationship 
between the antecedent and subsequent clauses. 
Let us turn to the second fact. It is generally acknowledged that then does not 
occur in so-caned speech-act conditionals (cf. Sweetser (1990»: 
(7) If she phoned yesterday, (*then) I was abroad. 
In speech-act conditionals such as (7), the antecedent clause does not denote a 
condition for the actualization of the state described in the subsequent clause: the 
event she phoned yesterday does not cause the speaker's existence in a foreign country. 
In this sense, the connection between the two clauses is not objective, but SUbjective. 
Note here that then does not occur, although the connection between the two clauses is 
subjective. This means that then has some function other than showing a subjective 
relationship between the two clauses. In this regard, Declerck and Reed (2001) point 
out that the subsequent clause in this type of conditionals does not denote a conclusion 
drawn from its antecedent clause, but the evidence or intermediate step for a further, 
implicit conclusion. In fact, sentence (7) can be paraphrased as foHows: 
(8) If she phoned yesterday, she can't have {reached / told} me, because I was 
abroad. (Declerck and Reed (2001:304) 
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As shown in (8), the overt subsequent clause of sentence (7) actually functions as 
evidence or a reason for the implicit conclusion she can t have {reached / told} me. 
This indicates that then occurs when it functions as a marker of a conclusion of the 
speaker's inference. 
Furthermore, then does not mark a mere conclusion of an inferential process; 
rather, it marks the final conclusion drawn from the proposition described in an 
if-clause. What final means here is literal: the speaker has no further or alternative 
conclusions. To clarify this point, let us observe the following example: 
(9) If he has passed into your ownership, he'll have to obey. If not, then we 
shall have to think of some other means of keeping him from his rightful 
mistress. (J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince) 
In (9), the two conditionals are presented contrastively. Here the speaker's final 
conclusion is presented in the subsequent clause of the second sentence. Because 
then marks the speaker's final conclusion, it cannot be deleted nor can it occur in 
positions other than the one exemplified in (9): 
(10) a. # If he has passed into your ownership, he'll have to obey. If not, we shall 
have to think of some other means of keeping him from his rightful 
mistress. 
b. # Ifhe has passed into your ownership, then he'll have to obey. Ifnot, then 
we shall have to think of some other means of keeping hIm from his 
rightful mistress. 
c. # If he has passed into your ownership, then he'll have to obey. If not, we 
shall have to think of some other means of keeping him from his rightful 
mistress. 
In (10a), then is deleted from the second sentence. In (lOb), then appears in both 
sentences. In (1 Oc), then occurs only in the first sentence. All these examples are 
anomalous and unacceptable in this context, which proves that then pragmatically 
functions as a marker of the speaker's final conclusion. 
As seen above, the pragmatic function of then is to mark the subjective relation 
between the antecedent and subsequent clauses, and to present the latter as the 
speaker's final conclusion. This is empirically corroborated by the following 
dialogue: 
( 11) "If they save Harry-" 
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"- then I will never say another word against them," said Mr. Weasley 
wearily. "It's too late, Molly, we'd better go up ... " 
(1. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Prince of Azkaban) 
In (11), the second interlocutor interrupts the first speaker, and, gives his own 
conclusion. The then in the second utterance marks his final conclusion, which is 
explicitly shown by the last utterance terminating the argument. In this case, then 
obligatorily occurs. The deletion of then renders the sentence anomalous: 
(12) # "- I will never say another word against them," said Mr. Weasley wearily. 
"It's too late, Molly, we'd better go up ... " 
In addition, if the first speaker in such a dialogue as (11) does not accept the second 
speaker's utterance as the final conclusion, the former can present hislher own final 
conclusion. In this case, too, the use of then is obligatory: 
(13)A: If they save Harry 
B: - then I will never say another word against them. 
A: No! I want to say that if they save Harry, *(then) we can shake hands and 
make up with them! 
The function of then as a marker of the final conclusion having no alternatives is 
further endorsed by the following examples: 
(14) If they accept you, (*then) they'll kill for you, I'm not sure. (= (2a)) 
(15) a. * If he typed her thesis, then he loves her or he got paid. 
b. * Ifhe typed her thesis, then he loves her or then he got paid. 
The example in (14) demonstrates that the use of then strengthens the degree of the 
speaker's conviction, which is incompatible with the expression I'm not sure, 
weakening the conviction. The examples in (15) indicate that then must be followed 
by one and only one conclusion. These phenomena can be attributed to the function 
of then as a pragmatic marker of the speaker's final conclusion. 
We conclude from all the above observations that the occurrence of then 
exemplified in (1) and (2) is motivated by the two pragmatic functions of then: 
connecting subjectively the two remarks described in the antecedent and subsequent 
clauses and showing explicitly that the remark in the subsequent clause is the 
speaker's final conclusion drawn from the premise described in the antecedent clause. 
